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陽江翻譯公司關(guān)鍵字： How about the organization and control over the allocation of residual claims to solve the two problems mentioned earlier, I talk about four points. The first point is residual claims and control to the corresponding (matching), which has a residual claim and risk people should have control over; in turn, have control over who should bear the risk. Alchian and Demusaici (1972) defined as the residual claim of ownership, while Grossman and Hart (1986) definition of ownership with residual rights of control. But no matter from which point of view, the general theory of the economics profession is always that they are linked. Which Which camp? You take the risk because you only need to control, or because you control the risks you should take it? This may be a chicken and egg problem. More classical explanation is that Frank Knight (1921), he believes, on human nature, a person can go for other people to take risks while not gain control over others; the other hand, no one is willing to accept others leadership rather than to get a guarantee from the latter. The latest explanation is that Harris and Raviv (1989). Why must correspond to the two, that if you do not correspond to risk has no control over the people, and people do not have control over the risk would lead to what consequences? It will lead to "cheap voting rights." This is something we want to talk about later. Of course, residual claims and control can not be completely correspond, if fully correspond to that we have a complete contract, the contract is the market entirely, there is no business, and there is no principal - agent relationship. The reason why companies are the principal - agent relationship, it is because not correspond exactly to the total number of people asked to make another part of human behavior to take some risks. From this perspective we can also understand the difference between stocks and bonds. Under normal circumstances, the owner of the shareholders equity risk, so he is a business owner, have control over, but under normal circumstances, the creditor does not take risks, not business owners, and no control. However, when companies can not repay the debt, the creditor becomes the owner of the enterprise. Why? He has become the de facto residual claimant, if an enterprise bankrupt, leaving the remaining number is the number of creditors, the creditors bear the risk, it took over control of the business. It should be emphasized is that business ownership is entirely a relative concept, that is, under what circumstances who have a residual claim and control, rather than an absolute concept. For example, if corporate income distribution between 0 and 100, the debt payment equal to 40, then the business income of more than 40, the shareholders are the owners; less than 40, the creditor becomes the owner. There are workers, to some extent, also the owner of the workers. Generally, we assume that workers get a fixed salary, the boss to get residual income, workers' behavior affects the interests of the boss, the boss's behavior does not affect the interests of workers. However, in certain circumstances, the owner of the bankrupt business, unemployment, and need to find a job, the boss's behavior affects the interests of workers. Especially for workers with special skills, even more so. In this sense, the workers and the boss is the principal agent. Therefore, the principal - agent relationship is a relative concept, which is our research enterprise bankruptcy, debt restructuring has very important significance.
The second point I want to emphasize that theory of the firm, especially Turkoglu Mann a Hart (1986) study of some abstract and I (Zhang, 1994) and more specific studies have shown that the residual claims of enterprises should be given to the enterprise the most important member, the relative importance of the people should have the residual claim.
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