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九江翻譯公司關(guān)鍵字：information, the government compared to other social existence, while having a clear advantage, but the need to search for the greater extent of information the greater the cost accordingly, and for those accessibility barriers to access to information channels, the Government and is not necessarily cheaper. We also note that the developed modern society, the media system in fact is part of the Government to bear the search costs. From the perception of information, the Government is not the existence of a transcendent reason, it is by "bounded rationality" of specific individuals (government officials) form, even if a whole can not exceed the "limited rationality" limitations. As a result of information search costs are also not complete a "bounded rationality" category. And "bounded rationality" is also critical tool rationalism Hayek when one of the important evidence. Even with extraordinary charisma Charisma (Charisma), from an objective point of view, is not fully rational. Therefore, the public is no reason to believe that the Government provide complete solution must be optimal, and thus its authority have reason to be questioned. Thus, as the weakening of the authority, the legitimate government-led approach requires mandatory will inevitably decrease.
Second, the government-led changes in the system will face maximum output maximization and rent both difficult trade-offs and choices, and thus can not successfully unlock the "North paradox" (Zhang, 1993). We believe that the different systems of the main objective function (utility function) is different. Lin (1989) distinguish between the behavior of groups of primary spontaneous action is characterized by induced institutional change and the state, the conscious action of the government's mandatory system is characterized by changes at this point is obviously different. The new language can be described as classical: the former are entirely economic cost - benefit comparison as a starting point, and cost more than the maximum benefits of institutional change as the objective function; while the latter take into account both economic benefits (maximum output), also consider non-economic benefits (the maximum stability of the ruling, the largest government party interests maximizing monopoly rents), rent only when the output maximization and maximize overall benefits outweighed the costs, institutional change will occur. An empirical hypothesis is that when there is a highly centralized system of government and the political market imperfections, institutional change in order to grasp the core of the highest decision-making power of the leader's preferences and their interests change with the basic orientation of the system is consistent between the two is premise, while the core leadership's preferences and their interests are consolidated into a single political authority, to maximize their social support. This indicates that the rulers (government), utility maximization does not necessarily consistent with the maximization of social wealth, the goal of maximizing social wealth only to be pushed into its rulers to achieve their own goals until the marginal contribution equal to zero. Thus, when taking into account the competitive constraints faced by the Government and the transaction cost constraints and other cost factors, the kind of tolerance and ignore the low efficiency of the system of long-term sustainability of the government does not act, is that you can understand. Therefore, the government-led institutional change does not necessarily have long-term stability of the power source.
Again, government-led institutional change, mainly from the external system or to make a formal constraints in order to adjust the internal fixation and relatively informal system or will it be bound to support such an adjustment is also worthy of study. Some Chinese scholars believe that the system lacks a number of socio-economic problems caused, and thus an urgent need to build the system, and universal system of knowledge-based system of imitation (Guo Xi Bao Huhan Chang, 2004) is considered optional cost-effective way. However, the different social and country customs, ideology, social capital formation as well as political and cultural heritage of the formation of different intrinsic differences in the system, similar systems will lead to very different efficiency. An empirical hypothesis is that the external system through the implementation of internal systems need to build the social system and cultural environment, the ability to perform external system depends on its internal compatibility of the system. The inherent characteristics of China's system is clearly different from the "overflow system" first-mover countries. When the government is considered to regulate the introduction of a market system is implemented in the country, should encounter from non-compatible internal system of conflict, violence with the characteristics of the government or state apparatus, or the use of incremental logic in the long run through " enlightenment 'to fix the inner system. We believe that the "dual track" system of operation is amended to provide for the inherent time and interests of the induction, for the future of the "merger" to prepare the necessary institutional environment. We believe that the use of violence can not be a continuing nature, and the correction of the intrinsic system is long and unsure of the direction of social initiative process. Therefore, a mandatory system of government to promote its inevitable encounter insurmountable institutional barriers.Finally, the need to point out that government-led institutional change need to draw a comprehensive bureaucrats and political structures, so we see that in the Chinese market-oriented reforms in order to ensure the viability of government-led, economic reform, but retain the existing government administrative system. This is actually a gradual "twin track" Line in continuity. However, from a practical point of view, has launched the "market" economic system of thinking encountered more and more from the conservative to "plan" thinking of the administrative system of the barriers to building a market system will inevitably damage the efficiency of unless the political system also consistent with the economy of institutional change. However, this can not be a logical continuation of government-led political system, the effectiveness of the changes in no way guaranteed. This is probably the government-led institutional change to set itself a dilemma.
V. ConclusionTool for theoretical studies of institutional change and evolution of rationalism rationalist thinking path, changes in the system for the government's leading role given to a different evaluation, but we can not arrive at their absolute certainty or absolute exclusion of the two government-led a simple conclusion. We believe that China's reform and progressive features, even on the authority of traditional Chinese culture, especially from the nature of political authority used, although the decision of the institutional change in the market tour, the role of government is essential, However, with a strong tool for rational thinking how efficient the government's "spontaneous social order," the germinal type structure with its initiative to play advantage, to ensure that the market ups and downs from intrusion, will be dedicated to the study of institutional change in China scholars faced with an important issue.
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