|
榆林翻譯公司關(guān)鍵字：JeanOi is that local cadres "are state agents, but also the local representative of the interests." By asylum doctrine (clintelism) local officials can successfully mediate the party - between the state and villagers, and finally at the national will of the demands of the farmers and their own strike a balance between the interests of [19].
Despite the different viewpoints of these authors, but their arguments are based on a same assumption: that the fight for a good harvest and farmers mainly in the country有資質(zhì)的正規(guī)翻譯公司哪個(gè)好 between the role of local cadres according to which side they stand on the conflict defined. They are not seen as party to the conflict not be treated as an independent pursuit of those interests. This assumption is in line with the actual time of the rural. However, after the dissolution of the communes of today, local officials have developed a separate, clear boundaries of their own interests, not only to participate in the competition for the harvest, and even to some extent have replaced state [20] of conflict one of the protagonists.
When we look after the dissolution of the communes in rural China, will see two phenomena seem contradictory: one is the rise of township village enterprises, the other is increasing the burden on peasants and rural areas "between cadres," the worse . Collective enterprises in which the prosperity of the village, you will hear the villagers who led them to the rich, "Homo habilis" (leading township or village cadres) praise, while in other villages, the local government政府許可的定點(diǎn)正規(guī)翻譯公司 had to use the judiciary and police police officers Laicui grain reminder, you will hear from time to time party secretary or mayor was angry villagers beat up the news. However, if we explore the reasons behind these two, you will find these two opposite trends on the surface is actually driven by the same forces - local officials to pursue their own interests, brought in some places the ascendant industrialization and prosperity, in other places, led to farmers unbearable exactions. If they have sufficient resources, relationships, ability and luck, they may successfully run the township village enterprises do not have these conditions in place, they are trying to think of a way from the farmers. The local village cadres and township enterprises developed equally strong desire, but they can not accomplish or do not conduct it. In fact, I visited many villages have had to do the collective experience of business專業(yè)英語翻譯公司科技文件翻譯哪里最好 failure, and this "tuition" nature is borne by the villagers.
The role of local cadres from the intermediary into a separate interest chase, means that China's rural political relations between the major changes. According to Oi's argument, in traditional Chinese competition for harvest in the context of the class, that is carried out between landowners and peasants, collectivization period of the harvest is the fight between state and society relations in the context of the national and between farmers [21]. In the current competition in rural China has become in this context between cadres and masses, that is between local cadres and farmers had started. If the past is in the state and local cadres to which side to choose between the farmers, then farmers now have to by the State and local officials to choose between which side of the.
For the country有資質(zhì)的正規(guī)翻譯公司哪個(gè)好, this is indeed not an easy choice. On the one hand, countries rely on local officials to ensure that its share (paid to the state's part) and the implementation of its policies, in fact, the interests of local cadres as an independent pursuit of the role was originally given by the State, but also by the state machine backed by force masterpiece. On the other hand, farmers have to prevent social unrest caused widespread discontent. It can do, probably only swing between the two, trying to find a balance.
|